
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30 March 1965

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY


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# LAOS



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30 Mar 65 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map

\*Laos: Government forces have moved swiftly in an effort to nip the rebellion mounted in central Laos by deposed rightist leader General Phoumi.

Loyal troops from the Se Bang Fai River area this morning occupied Thakhek, the Mekong River town which had been seized by dissident rightist elements this past weekend. Additional government troops have been airdropped into the area by Laotian Air Force planes.

The rebel forces were reported withdrawing to the north, perhaps intending to join with other dissident units located in the region south of the Nam Theun River. Phoumi sympathizers in other areas may have been deterred from similar uprisings by the relative strength and alacrity of the government's reaction to the seizure of Thakhek.

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<u>Cyprus</u>: The climate for Greek-Turkish negotiations appears to be improving slightly.

The UN mediator's report is scheduled for release to the public today despite Ankara's opposition. It is expected to call for early negotiations among the interested parties.

The Greeks claim credit for securing Makarios' agreement to rotation of the Turkish Army contingent on Cyprus yesterday. The Greeks also state that Makarios will now permit the duty-free importation of relief supplies from Turkey for the Turkish Cypriots.

Greek Premier Papandreou has told the US ambassador that he will allow no pretext for war to develop and no misunderstanding which could constitute justification for war

On 27 March Papandreou met the new Turkish ambassador to Greece. The Turk left the meeting in a "well-satisfied" mood, according to Greek officials. Yesterday, the Turkish ambassador began what may develop into a series of informal meetings with the Greek foreign minister to discuss specific Turkish complaints regarding Cyprus.

The Greeks do not preclude formal direct talks between Athens and Ankara, but they prefer that the Turks and Greek Cypriots initiate such discussions. Turkish officials, however, insist that only Greek-Turkish negotiations are possible and that Makarios' views as to what is acceptable must be ignored.

The Turks still warn that unless some means are found soon to reduce tension on Cyprus, to improve the security and economic position of the Turkish

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	•	tinuing	t community, and to prevent Makarios from conto carry out faits accomplis, Turkish interventhe island will become inevitable.	
	25X1	/Th fighter Cyprio	ere have been further reports that Soviet-built aircraft will be made available to the Greek	
5X1		A sour	ce of the US Army attaché in Nicosia reports G fighters destined for Cyprus may be in Da-	25X1
	25X1	masca	<b>'</b>	
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USSR: Brezhnev's agricultural plan for 1966-70 recognizes the need for a feasible program to raise agricultural production and acknowledges that the substantial resources needed to implement it must come at the expense of growth in other parts of the budget.

Agriculture's share of the total state investment is to rise from 14 percent in 1964 to about 20 percent of the total in 1970. Preliminary analysis suggests that the noninvestment costs of the plan will rise much less rapidly but will still add significantly to the state's contribution to agriculture.

Although Brezhnev did not specify which budget allocations would provide the additional funds, a reduction in the rate of growth of some sectors of heavy industry appears probable. The production of some types of military equipment may be reduced. However, initial examination does not suggest that the program will be competitive with military research and development.

Of the planned investment in agriculture--71 billion rubles during the 1966-70 period--the state will provide 41 billion, or about 60 percent. In the seven-year plan, the state had been scheduled for only 30 percent of total agricultural investment. While the present state share of investment appears feasible, it is uncertain whether collective farms will be able to provide the remaining 30 billion rubles. The new prices for farm products provided by the plan, however, may make the planned investment possible.

No official data are yet available on plans for total investment in 1970. As a result of the new agricultural program, however, it seems probable that state nonagricultural investment will grow even more slowly than in the first half of the decade when the rate of industrial growth declined. A recovery in this rate consequently seems unlikely during the next five years.

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Spain: Stiffening attitudes on both sides may lead to a showdown between students and the regime.

Students are now responding in greater numbers to calls for demonstrations against the compulsory student syndicate, and the usual official techniques for dealing with student unrest are proving ineffective thus far.

The government had announced that "normal conditions" must prevail before negotiations on student demands could begin.

The government's hardening attitude is apparent in the early morning arrest on 26 March of five student leaders in Madrid. Among them was Alvaro Gil Robles, son of the Christian Democratic leader, whose house was ransacked in a fruitless search for incriminating evidence. In Barcelona, authorities resorted to a provisional mass expulsion of students in the schools of law, economics, and commerce.

If the students maintain discipline, the regime may crack down hard despite the risk that this could increase opposition rather than quell it.

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<b>₹</b>		25X1					
	British Guiana: Disagreement over tax policy has						
	led to the first serious clash between Premier Burnham and Finance Minister D'Aguiar since their governing						
	coalition was formed last De <b>c</b> ember. The conflict centers around Burnham's refusal to accommodate	25X1					
	D'Aguiar's desire to abolish certain taxes in hopes of stimulating economic growth. Since both leaders are	20/(1					
	determined to prevent Cheddi Jagan from returning to power, they probably will find a way to resolve this						
	dispute without dissolution of the coalition or withdrawal	25X1					
	of United Force support for Burnham's People's National Congress in the legislature.	25/1					
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